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Global IR, Global Modernity and Civilization in Turkish Islamist Thought: A Critique 




This article responds to Acharya’s call to integrate deep area studies knowledge and methods 
into a global IR by presenting the findings of an empirical enquiry into the concept of 
civilization in Turkish Islamist thought. It delves into primary and secondary sources, in 
English and Turkish, and in particular into the works of a number of emblematic Islamist 
thinkers in Republican (post-1923) Turkey, to show that their approach to ‘Islamic civilization’ 
is defined through nineteenth century, modern concepts, shared with so-called Western thinkers 
and contexts. The conclusions of the study constitute the basis for a critique of the culturalist 
perspective in IR which treats cultural and civilizational differences as foundational or even 
immutable. The article posits, instead, that a truly global IR can only be developed if it is 
underpinned by the concepts of global modernity and global history (as proposed by Buzan 
and Lawson, among other IR theorists and historians), across an imagined ‘East’ and ‘West’. 
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Amitav Acharya’s call for a research agenda in pursuit of a ‘global IR’ invited International 
Relations theorists to move away from what he sees as the ‘monistic universalism’ of the 
discipline towards a pluralist direction (Acharya 2014b: 649). Acharya posited that a global IR 
would transcend ‘the distinction between West and non-West’ (Acharya, 2014b: 649), ‘eschew 
cultural exceptionalism and parochialism’ and put forward a ‘broad conception of agency’ of 
non-Western actors (Acharya, 2014b: 651). Furthermore, a global IR would emphasize 
regional worlds and the inter-connectedness between them, examine how ideas and norms 
circulate between global and local levels and integrate deep area studies knowledge and 
methods into the discipline of IR (Acharya, 2014b: 654-655).  
 
Acharya’s call is laudable and a move towards ‘global’ IR is overdue. In exploring the concept 
of civilization in Turkish Islamic thought, the present article answers his call in that it seeks to 
eschew cultural parochialism, affirm the agency of non-Western actors, emphasize regional 
inter-connectedness and integrate deep area studies knowledge into IR concerns. But, in the 
process, the article also shows that there are limitations to how far Acharya’s proposed IR is 
truly ‘global’.  
 
The final item on Acharya’s list of elements of a global IR calls on IR theorists to ‘explore and 
conceptualize the multiple and different ways in which civilizations encounter each other’ 
(Acharya, 2014b: 656). With this statement, Acharya suggests that civilizations constitute 
meaningful entities which have a role to play in IR (as actors, foci of identity or drivers of 
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action) and imply that the desired pluralism towards which the discipline should be moving is, 
at least partly, a civilizational pluralism.  
 
I argue in this article that Acharya’s civilizational perspective of IR – also elaborated on in his 
other work (Acharya, 2013) - is emblematic of the discipline’s shift in a ‘culturalist’ direction, 
which views culture as defining norms and values in a fashion and to a degree that renders 
them incommensurable. This trend is observable, as I show below, in recent developments in 
a number of theoretical areas of the discipline: some strands of constructivism, the English 
School and post-colonialism; civilizational approaches to IR; and in the ‘multiple modernities’ 
thesis, in so far as it has influenced IR.  
 
My article constitutes a critique of this culturalist impulse in IR, of which Acharya is 
emblematic, by drawing on insights from theoretical debates that underpin global history and 
global modernity. It presents the findings of empirical research into Islamist thought on 
‘Islamic civilization’ in Republican (post-1923) Turkey, a ‘hard’ case given the Islamists’ self-
definition as part of a civilization antagonistic to or, at least, distinct from ‘Western’ 
civilization. By delving into primary and secondary sources, in English and Turkish, I show 
that a modern concept of civilization frames and ultimately defines Turkish Islamist approaches 
towards civilization. This concept is shared between Islamists in Turkey and so-called Western 
thinkers and contexts, which means that, figuratively speaking, they are ‘joined at the hip’ 
despite being presented as split and at odds with one another.  
 
I show that, rather than ‘civilizations’ going back in history, and dividing humanity in 
fundamental ways, as is often presumed, the very idea of ‘civilization’ – both in its universalist 
sense and interpreted as a discrete human collective entity – and, specifically, the idea of an 
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‘Islamic civilization’, originated in the nineteenth century, a period defined by the conceptual 
revolution of modernity, which entailed the objectification, or reification, of collective social 
phenomena. It thereafter shaped the conceptual framework of Europeans and people in other 
parts of the world, and is still with us today. The article outlines how the concept of civilization 
was adopted by generations of intellectuals in Republican Turkey, in conversation with and 
close intellectual proximity to ‘the West’ as well as ‘the East’. It thereby shows that Islamic 
thought in Turkey, even when it denounces ‘Western civilization’, shares with the West the 
modern concept of ‘civilization’. The article concludes by drawing on the implications of the 
empirical findings for a ‘global’ IR, underpinned by a global, shared modernity rather than a 
civilizational fragmented pluralism. 
 
Culturalism in IR 
 
IR has been in the throes of a ‘cultural turn’ since the 1990s. In its multiple and varied 
meanings, culture has become a growing concern in some of the sub-disciplines of IR, such as 
security (Katzenstein, 1996) and foreign policy (Hill, 2015), and of IR theory proper. The 
‘cultural turn’ may refer simply to being open and curious about exploring collective identities 
and ways of behaviour and self-definition, and should not be necessarily equated with 
‘culturalism’, which treats cultural and civilizational differences as foundational or even 
immutable.  But the line between the two is a fine one and culturalism is becoming increasingly 
influential in IR. 
 
The growing preoccupation with culture in IR has been intricately linked with the rise of 
constructivism in the post-Cold War period, initially as a response to realism’s dominance. The 
publication of definitive constructivist works, such as by Lapid and Kratochwil (1996) and 
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Katzenstein (1996), signalled the beginnings of this interest, which continues to intensify to 
this day. Reus-Smit is right in stating that one strand of constructivism takes a rather narrow 
definition of culture as ‘norms’ but also in claiming that another strand relies on a ‘default’ 
conception of culture as unitary and coherent, one that has long been overcome in anthropology 
and sociology (Reus-Smit, 2018: 119-54). Rather than the entire constructivist ‘church’, it is 
this latter strand in constructivism that is more susceptible to culturalist views, over and beyond 
a concern with culture.1 Alongside this constructivist strand, a culturalist line within the English 
School, which goes back to Martin Wight’s work and his idea that a cultural unity must 
underpin international society (‘system’ in his terminology) and international order if they are 
to emerge and survive, continues to endure (Reus-Smit, 2018: 84-118).  Elements of this can 
be observed in  Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan’s recent work on Asia, China and 
Confucianism (Zhang and Buzan, 2012) and Buzan and Acharya’s focus on regions and non-
Western IR theory (Buzan and Acharya, 2010).2 
 
Culturalist tendencies have also been strengthened by some post-colonial theorising. The 
critiques of the ‘Eurocentric’ or ‘Western-centric’ foundations of the IR discipline (Hobson, 
2004; Hobson, 2012; Mazlish, 2005; Kayaoğlu 2010, Kuru 2016; Bowden, 2009) were inspired 
by Edward Said’s thesis on Orientalism which aimed to counter essentialist approaches to 
culture. Postcolonial thinkers such as John Hobson have sought to demonstrate through 
historical analysis that the rise of the West owed to the East more than Eurocentric perspectives 
would allow for (Hobson, 2004). The book countered Eurocentrism’s positing of a ‘strict 
dividing line between the East and the West’ which ‘serves to represent the East and West as 
 
1 Many constructivist works deal with culture while avoiding the pitfalls of culturalism. One example 
is Bettiza’s work, where he argues that, whilst cultural entities are ‘imagined communities’, they turn 
into ‘social facts’, powerful carriers of meaning and knowledge (Bettiza, 2015). 
2 The ‘culturalist’ hints in Buzan’s works cited here – and they are only hints - sit uneasily alongside 
his book, co-authored with Lawson, on the nineteenth century global transformation (Buzan and 
Lawson, 2015). For an incisive and sympathetic critique, see Wilson, 2016. 
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not only separate but qualitatively different’ (Hobson, 2004: 283).3   Ironically, however, and 
despite such good intentions, the postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism has offered fertile 
ground for culturalist perspectives: this has occurred mainly by virtue of essentializing ‘the 
West’. The suggestion that there exists a foundational separation between ‘Western’ and ‘non-
Western IR’ in terms of knowledge, values and epistemologies has become a widespread – 
albeit not universal - post-colonial position, playing into an interpretation of cultural specificity 
which bolsters culturalist perspectives  
 
Over and beyond constructivism, the English School and post-colonialism, within which 
culturalist views emerge only in certain instances, or sometimes by implication, there exist two 
areas in IR theory (broadly defined) where culturalist positions are explicit: ‘civilizational 
analysis’ and the ‘multiple modernities’ paradigm. With regards to the first, I am not referring 
to the much-criticized views of Samuel Huntington but to a broader category of thinkers who, 
while rejecting the idea of a clash between civilizations in favour of cooperation or dialogue, 
see civilizations as ‘building blocs’ or even actors in IR, meaningful entities around which 
international relations are organized and policies are formulated and executed. One example of 
such a thinker, already mentioned, is Amitav Acharya (2013, 2014a), whose starting point is 
civilizational even though he talks of ‘inter-civilizational convergence’. Other authors who, 
while eschewing a crude essentialism, still take civilizational differences as foundational, are 
Johann Arnason (2003) and Fred Dallmayr (2002). Another example of the civilizational stance 
is Fabio Petito’s work, which takes its cue from the tradition of ‘dialogue of civilizations’, a 
response to both the ‘clash of civilizations’ and the ‘end of history’ discourses of the 1990s 
 
3 A number of other postcolonial theorists also argue against culturalist positions. One example is 
Bhambra’s work which highlights the connections between European and other civilizations at the 
origins of modernity and puts forward a case for ‘connected histories’ (Bhambra, 2007). Another is 
Chakrabarty who calls for an ‘integrated human history’ (Chakrabarty, 2007: 42-46).  
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(Petito, 2016: 79). Christopher Coker (2019) comes to civilizational analysis from a different 
perspective, focusing on the culturalist behaviour of ‘civilizational states’ such as Russia and 
China which arrogate onto themselves the right to defend particular civilizations (Coker, 2019).   
 
Petito is right to describe the theoretical developments of civilizational politics and multiple 
modernities as interlocked (Petito, 2016: 83-84). Although not an IR theory as such, the 
multiple modernities paradigm has influenced the discipline in many ways. It accepts that 
modernization is a universal process but sees its results as non-uniform; positing the view that 
societies do not become ‘alike’ as they modernize. The main thesis here is that civilizations are 
historically discrete but are changed by the onslaught of modernization; as 
societies/cultures/civilizations engage with modernity, each produces its own version of it, not 
conforming to a uniform and universal, let alone Western, model (Eisenstadt, 2003). The 
multiple modernities paradigm contains many variants but at its core still ‘presumes peoples’ 
disparate experiences with modernity in different parts of the world’ (Bilgin, 2016: 497); as 
such, it remains, ultimately, associated with ‘pluralist civilizational analysis’ (Wagner, 2012; 
see also Eisenstadt, 2003) . 
 
Countering Culturalism: Insights from Global History and Global Modernity 
 
Culturalist analyses within IR rest on the implicit assumption and, in turn, reinforce the view 
that discrete and incommensurable perspectives exist across societies and cultures. But is 
culturalism borne out by the facts? The answer to this question can only be historically specific 
and contextual. It must also rest on, or at least be informed by, empirical research which draws 
on deep area studies knowledge (to borrow Acharya’s wording). I draw on such empirical 
research in what follows to demonstrate that, in at least one case (albeit a ‘hard’ one), 
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differences between cultures or civilizations are not as deep as is assumed or, indeed, 
proclaimed by the various proponents of the culturalist paradigm.   
 
I frame the conceptual context of my empirical study by drawing on insights from the twin 
ideas of ‘global history’ and ‘global modernity’, ideas that are intrinsically anti-culturalist.   I 
use the definition of ‘global history’ offered by Sebastian Conrad in contradistinction to ‘world 
history’ which he defines as the history of separate civilizations and the study of the links 
between them (Conrad, 2016: 62-63). Conrad maintains that the concept of ‘global’ refers 
necessarily to connections and is inherently relational. It points to the synchronicity of events; 
and causality on a global scale (Conrad, 2016; see also Drayton and Motadel, 2018; Bayly, 
2004). The turn to ‘global history’ has impacted a number of more narrow areas of history. 
Global intellectual history seeks to highlight the transnational aspects of the circulation of 
global ideas, concepts and practices (Moyn and Sartori, 2013). Conceptual history has recently 
moved away from international and comparative history writing to global history or entangled 
histories (Pernau, 2012), and ‘comparing concepts across cultural encounters’ (Ifversen, 2015: 
291; see also Wigen, 2018).  
 
‘Global history’ is a broad category, often loosely or poorly defined, as is ‘global modernity’ 
– but they both have their usefulness and would have to be invented if they did not exist (Buzan 
and Lawson 2015b). Buzan and Lawson distinguish global modernity from multiple 
modernities and the colonial modernity of post-colonialists, emphasizing how modernity 
became a global process both in its origins and in its outcomes, through ‘entangled histories’ 




Buzan and Lawson’s exposition and defence of global modernity is historical through and 
through. It rests on the depiction of the nineteenth century as the major turning point for 
contemporary international relations (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 5). They use the term ‘global 
modernity’ to describe the sea-change which engulfed humanity since that turning point. The 
authors eschew the ‘multiple modernities’ thesis because the latter ‘retains a sense of Europe 
as the original, definitive modern experience’: instead of approaching modernity as ‘a uniquely 
European development arising from endogenous, self-generating civilizational qualities’ they 
see it as a global process, the result of ‘entangled histories’ that ‘combined to vault Western 
states into a position of pre-eminence’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 7). They treat modernity as 
the product of fusion between the West and the non-West, a transformation in which the core 
and the then periphery were deeply intertwined (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 127), and state that 
the transformation to modernity ‘was global from the beginning and remains so today’ (Buzan 
and Lawson, 2015: 172).  
 
Buzan and Lawson focus on the material aspects of global modernity and see the 
transformation it entailed, from the nineteenth century onwards, in terms of ‘industrialization, 
rational state-building and ideologies of progress’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 1). They treat the 
ideational transformation as equally comprehensive and dramatic (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 
313) – it has now ‘permeated the whole planet’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2015:  317) - but define 
it mostly in terms of the ideologies of progress that rose to prominence in the nineteenth 
century, namely liberalism, nationalism, socialism and ‘scientific’ racism (Buzan and Lawson, 
2015: 3). My emphasis here, however, in contrast to Buzan and Lawson, is on the conceptual 
revolution which occurred in the nineteenth century, a revolution which constituted an equally 
important sea-change to the ideological one and forms the framework of my analysis for the 




‘Civilization’: A Nineteenth Century Concept  
 
‘Civilization’, in its universalist sense of being a world-wide phenomenon defined by objective 
criteria of what is valuable and worthwhile, was a late eighteenth – early nineteenth century 
invention, even though the meaning of the term developed in somewhat diverse ways in France, 
Germany and Britain (Elias, 1994: 5-23; Al-Azmeh, 2001: 1903). There is no full consensus 
on this, but its first modern usage appears to have been in 1756, though François Guizot 
popularized the term (in France) in the 1830s (Yurdusev, 2003: 56-57; Reinhart, 2007: 268-
269).  
 
The word and concept of ‘civilization’ as a universal process entered the Ottoman language 
from French and English in the same decade, the 1830s, initially as ‘sivilizasyon’ or 
‘sivilization’. The Ottoman vocabulary had hitherto been drawn from Ibn Khaldun who used 
‘umran’, the word closest to ‘civilization’, to mean the totality of human habitation, consisting 
of ‘medeniyet’ (settled human habitation) and ‘bedeviyet’ (nomadism). Eventually ‘medeniyet’ 
replaced the English/French word ‘sivilizasyon’, signifying at first ‘that which pertains to the 
city’, ‘urbanity’ or ‘city culture’, a contrast to nomadism (Wigen, 2015a: 441-442; Reinhart, 
2007: 272; Baykara, 1990; Karpat, 2001: 11). The term referred to fractures internal to Ottoman 
society: for example, whereas the typical Damascene was seen as a member of ‘the noble Arab 
people’, Syrian Bedouin or the highland Arabs of Mount Lebanon were seen as ‘vahşi’ (savage) 
(Hanioğlu, 2008: 88; see also Deringil, 1998; Makdisi, 2002: 779-7804). Increasingly, 
however, civilization in the late Ottoman period also became associated with 
European/Western civilization, linked to science, rationality and the Enlightenment (Zürcher, 
 
4 For a critique of these ideas on Ottoman Orientalism, see Palabıyık, 2010. 
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1993: 64). In subsequent decades, ‘medeniyet’ came to be used almost interchangeably with 
‘uygarlık’, the latter word having etymological roots in Turkish in contrast to the Arabic 
formation of the former (Meriç, 1996). 
 
The point to emphasize here is that the word ‘civilization’ began being employed almost 
concurrently in European and Ottoman contexts: the concept was new for Europe too, part and 
parcel of a transformed modern intellectual framework which reshaped approaches to the 
historical past, and between societies. It spread among the Ottoman intelligentsia in the 1830s 
at the same time as it did in French popular culture (Reinhart, 2007: 268-269) constituting, in 
other words, a ‘synchronic’ development.5  
 
The idea of an Islamic civilization as one of the civilizations ‘in the plural’ came to the fore in 
the late nineteenth century in reaction to the idea of a universal, modern, European civilization. 
It came about alongside similar ideas in many other parts of the world, such as pan-Slavism, 
the pan-German movement, pan-Asianism, pan-Buddhism, Hindu universalism. From the 
1860s ‘the Muslim world as a geographical civilizational entity, not simply denoting a shared 
religious identity, emerged … in relation to the evolution of the notion of the West’ (Aydin, 
2007: 4). By the 1880s, after the loss of Ottoman territories in the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia, 
pan-Islamic solidarity developed also ‘as a geopolitical concept’; Ottoman intellectuals ‘began 
to perceive international relations as a global conflict between Christian Europe and the Muslim 
world’, thinking of ‘global cultures through the concept of “Şark ve Garp” (East and West)’ 
(Aydın, 2007: 59-60, 73).6  
 
5 For a discussion of the international political context in which the Ottomans started using the word 
‘civilization’ in its universalist sense and an analysis of how the word ‘medeniyet’ travelled across 
settings, time and texts, see Wigen, 2015b. He is focusing on the civilizing of emotions. 
6 Most closely associated with the idea of an Islamic civilization was a group of intellectuals of the 
1860s and 1870s, later labelled ‘Young Ottomans’; they are credited with inventing pan-Islamism, 




The emergence of the modern concept of civilization engendered a re-negotiation between late 
Ottoman society and its past history and, in the tumultuous decades between the 1870s and the 
1920s, different conceptions of ‘civilization’ were continually contested.7 By the time of the 
establishment of the Republic however, the lines were clearly drawn: East8  faced off West, an 
‘Islamic’ civilization was juxtaposed to a ‘Western’ civilization (equated with civilization in 
its universal sense, in the eyes of many). The conflict in the history of Republican Turkey, 
between secularists and Islamists, has not been about how to define East and West but over 
which one represents the superior model.9  
 
Civilization in Turkish Islamist Thought  
 
Buzan and Lawson suggest that we are still living ‘in a world defined predominantly by the 
downstream consequences of the nineteenth-century global transformation’ (Buzan and 
 
7 Aydin notes that the abstraction called the Muslim world cuts Muslim societies off from their real 
history (Aydin, 2017). 
8 Note that, in the period after independence, the ‘East’ was also identified with anti-imperialism against 
the ‘West’ (Berkes, 1998: 437-439). This is just one of many definitions of ‘the East’ which have varied 
across geographical and historical contexts.   
9 The idea of a civilizational rivalry between ‘East’ and ‘West’, which became prevalent by the 1920s, 
defined the last phase of the intellectual trajectory of the Young Turks (who, loosely defined, dominate 
the Republic until 1950: Zürcher, 1993). With the arrival of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his circle, who 
led the war of independence (1919-23) and the newly established Republic, the ‘Westernizer’ branch 
of the Young Turks (garbcılar) became dominant. They saw European civilization as indivisible and 
wanted Turkey to adopt it wholesale. There was no attempt, as there had been by a thinker such as Ziya 
Gökalp, to differentiate between Turkish culture and European civilization because the Kemalists aimed 
to transform both ‘high’ Islamic civilization and ‘low’ popular culture.  (Zürcher, 2010: 148-149). For 
Mustafa Kemal, secular reforms aimed to raise Turkey ‘to the level of “contemporary civilisation”’ 
(Davison, 1998: 147). He saw European civilization as the only civilization and, in his view, any nation 
was capable of ‘modern civilization’ as long as they were given the educational and material needs to 
achieve it (Mango, 2008: 163, 170). A fervent Turkish nationalism was the order of the day in the first 
formative years and decades after 1923 but it was seen as bringing Turkey in line with modernity and 
incorporating Turkey into Western ‘civilization’ while, at the same time, asserting the country’s 
independent identity.  
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Lawson, 2015: 5) – and this becomes clear when we examine the conceptual framing of 
‘Islamic civilization’ by Islamist thinkers in Turkey through the Republican period, until today. 
 
In what follows, I focus on a number of canonical or emblematic Islamist intellectuals, from 
the early years of the Republic until the present day, to show how they appropriate the East-
West dichotomy and use the concept of an ‘Islamic civilization’ in their pitch for authenticity 
(in the sense of a society needing to be ‘true to itself’ and to its past) against the West; while 
forgetting that the very concepts that they use against the West, ‘civilization’ and ‘Islamic 
civilization’, were products of a common experience in modernity which irrevocably binds 
them to the Western world. Furthermore, I show that their various Islamist interpretations of 
‘Islamic civilization’, and the role of Turkey within it, have been, across the decades, intimately 
tied to Western and global intellectual trends, developments and conversations.10  
 
Islamist (and, more broadly, Islamic) thought in Turkey was marginalized and suppressed in 
the years after 1923 but, with the introduction of multi-partyism in 1945 and the Democrat 
Party’s electoral success in 1950, the parameters of intellectual debate began to alter.11 Already 
in 1952, an ‘Islamic revival’ was being observed (Lewis, 1952: 41, 46-47). In that period, left-
wing voices dominated cultural life and predominated among the intelligentsia but, by the 
1970s, the right more than counter-balanced the left (Findley, 2010: 318). Islamic revival was 
stimulated by and in turn fuelled the popular religious orders, which had survived the Kemalist 
 
10 Vömel (2019) highlights the ways in which Turkish Islamist thought developed also in conversation 
with global Islamist thought.  
11 The effects of this shift must not be exaggerated: between the 1940s and the 1980s, Turkish politics 
was dominated by the conflict between right and left, with issues of civilizational/cultural belonging 
and the role of religion occupying a less central role even though they remained an element in political 
party ideology (Toprak, 1981: 124). This also partly applies to the period henceforth, up to the 
contemporary moment: it would be a mistake to see Turkish public life as exclusively dominated by 
questions of belonging and identity as opposed to material considerations. The two sets of issues, at the 
very least, are always inter-linked. 
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onslaught despite being formally banned; and it also began to permeate party politics although 
the different orders had divergent approaches to party political behaviour and action.12  
 
It is within this broad context of Islamic revivalism that there emerged a first generation of 
Islamist intellectuals focusing more directly on the idea of ‘Islamic civilization’ and Turkey’s 
role within it. The major figures of this new civilizational intellectual movement, which came 
into its own in the 1950s, were Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Nurettin Topçu and Sezai Karakoç. 
These thinkers were part and parcel of intellectual trends and developments beyond Turkey. 
When they started to gain prominence, in the inter-war period, the discourse of East-West 
civilization and ‘a diagnosis regarding the conflict between the two’ was becoming more 
widespread among non-Western intellectuals (including, incidentally, pro-Western liberals) in 
many other parts of the world (Aydın, 2007: 12). The 1930s were also a time when Islamic 
modernism was in decline in the Middle East, eclipsed by secular nationalism, socialism and 
fascism (Kurzman, 2002: 26). The first generation of Islamist intellectuals in Turkey were 
illustrative of this decline and the rise of more conservative thinking, often tinged with fascist 
undertones. 
 
Kısakürek (1904-83), who by the 1960s and 1970s was viewed as the dominant conservative 
voice in Turkey,13 saw Islam not strictly as a religion but also as a civilization and ‘reinvented 
the Ottoman past as being the essence of Islamic civilization’ (Yavuz, 2003: 114). Already 
from the 1940s and 1950s, he was promoting the idea of Büyük Doğu (Great East) which he 
 
12 Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1876-1960), the founder of the Nurcu-Nakşibendi order which constituted 
the most important Islamic revivalist movement in the mid-twentieth century at the popular level, had 
started in the 1920s to reject political engagement, relying on religious mobilization with a view that 
politics should be influenced indirectly. The Nakşibendi movement itself took a more directly political 
approach. One of its major leaders, Mehmet Zahid Kotku (1897-1980), transformed the Nakşibendi 
tradition along the lines of the political code of the Republic which meant a convergence of Islamism 
and nationalism.  
13 He was also embraced by the Nakşibendis (Mardin 2005: 155) – see note 12, above. 
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saw as a great civilization, confronting the West (Kısakürek 1968: 10). For Kısakürek, Turkish 
Muslims must not imitate the West as they have done in the past; and nationalism must serve 
Islam, not vice-versa. Islamism was an alternative to Kemalism, ‘not a posture/attitude but 
rather a search for a coherent, systematic and totalistic ideology’ (Duran, 2001: 11-12, 209). 
He recognized only two nations, Muslims and non-Muslims, and viewed Türklük (Turkishness) 
as inevitably linked to Islam.14 He saw Islam as the ‘real and universal civilization’, immune 
to the shortcomings of Western civilization. Islamic civilization was ‘ontologically and 
epistemologically different from the West’ and superior to it because it was based on the sharia 
and on ‘cooperation, right, justice and virtue whereas western one [sic] was based on might 
and interest’. Islam was an alternative to the Western tradition because it removes its injustices 
and emptiness (Duran, 2001: 321, 32, 94, 201).  
 
In short, Kısakürek employed in his writings a conceptualization of civilization and, more 
particularly, Islamic civilization which had originated in the nineteenth century Ottoman 
context and which was shared by Europe, and later the West more broadly. Despite his 
promotion of an Islamic civilization as an alternative to the West, he shared with Western 
Orientalism an essentialization of ‘West’ and ‘East’ (Duran, 2001: 201).  
 
This was partly because, notwithstanding the anti-Western animus which characterized his 
thinking, Kısakürek had been schooled in Western and particularly French thought (Findley, 
2010: 339; Kısakürek, 1982: 7-93). He was typical of a broader trend discernible in the 
religious journals of the time, which used dominant Western concepts to restate Islamic values 
(Lewis, 1952: 44-45). Furthermore, despite his own emphasis on his traditional roots, his 
 
14 According to Kısakürek, only when Turkey returned to its former glory would the light shine upon 
the Muslim world once again. Büyük Doğu would be a land cleansed of Jews and Dönme (crypto-Jews 
who had converted publicly to Islam) (Guida, 2012: 119). 
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upbringing and education were Western; ‘his criticism of the republican ideology was forged 
in a genuinely Western mode’ and his work had the clear imprint of French models. In one 
view, Necip Fazıl’s conservative thought showed a republican imprint through its ‘imitation 
and adoption of Western forms of debate’ (Kısakürek, 1982: 7-93; see also Mardin, 1994: 194-
196). 
 
The global economic crisis of the 1970s led, by the 1980s, to the questioning of modernisation, 
a surge in conservatism and the end of the ‘ideological hegemony of nationalist-statist 
developmentalism’ (Gülalp, 1997: 56). Following the 1980 military coup, and the political 
crushing of the left, the country shifted direction to the right and the military itself promoted 
the idea of the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’.15 Other Islamist ideas increasingly permeated the 
political scene. The centre-right Motherland Party, which became dominant in the 1980s under 
the leadership of Turgut Özal, adopted some of the positions of Necmettin Erbakan’s ‘National 
Outlook’ ideology16 which had been previously promoted by the National Order Party (1970-
71) and the National Salvation Party (1972-81).17 
 
 
15 The idea of Islamic civilization was also of considerable significance in this body of thought. In 1970, 
influential business, university and politics individuals founded the Aydınlar Ocağı (‘Hearths of the 
Enlightened’) to ‘break the monopoly of left-wing intellectuals on the social, political and cultural 
debate’. The chief ideologue of this trend, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, proposed the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ 
asserting that ‘Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because of a number of (supposedly) striking 
similarities between their pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization’ and deemed that Turkish culture 
was built on a Turkish and an Islamic element (Zürcher, 1993: 302-303). 
16 The idea of ‘Islamic civilization’ was also significant in the thought of Necmettin Erbakan (1926-
2011), the chief ideologue of the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, which dominated Turkish 
Islamist politics from the 1970s onwards. Milli Görüş brought together aspects of Islam, Ottoman and 
Turkish norms and sought a cultural revival based on these norms (Erbakan, 1975). Erbakan propagated 
the idea of Adil Düzen (Just Order) which he described as the pinnacle of civilization, combining the 
truth of Islam with Western technical achievements (Erbakan, 1993: 9-11). For Erbakan, Turkey was 
‘the cultural centre of Islamic civilization in Europe’, also because of its association with the Balkans 
(Yavuz, 2003: 236). 
17 One position that the Motherland Party adopted from Milli Görüş pertained to the relationship 
between Turkey and Western civilization. It was that the strength of the West lay in its industry, not its 
civilization, that technology can be separated from Western civilization and that development required 
faith, not the transformation of culture (Toprak, 1993: 241-242). 
17 
 
Partly as a result of the general crisis of secular ideologies and worldviews, and in the context 
of increasing prominence of Islamism politically, a second generation of Islamist intellectuals 
which included influential figures such as Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel, Rasim Özdenören, İlhan 
Kutluer and Ersin Gürdoğan, proposed new standpoints on Islamic civilization and critiques of 
the West and ‘universal’ civilization. They refused to countenance the possibility of Islam and 
the West reaching accommodation and argued that science and technology, as practised in the 
West, are incompatible with Islam. They collectively ‘rejected the grand narratives of the 
nineteenth century such as progress, science, reason, and civilization [in its universal sense] 
and [have] essentialized modernity by positioning it in contradistinction to Islam’ (Duran, 
2001: 10).  
 
This generation of Islamist intellectuals rejected the glorification of the Ottoman past (Toprak, 
1993: 246-249); they stressed the Koran and sunna, and the period of the first four rightly 
guided caliphs, vis-à-vis the historization of Islam within the framework of the Ottoman 
Empire (Yavuz, 2003: 118). They also rejected the West in ‘civilizational terms’ and saw the 
unquestioning acceptance of industrialization as a submission to imperialism. They criticized 
the notion of development wholesale and asserted the superiority of the spiritual values of Islam 
over the material wealth of the West (Gülalp, 1997: 57-61). They rebelled against science, 
technology, civilization and democracy and argued that science in the modern world serves as 
the new idol; they also rejected the market and saw technology as responsible for waste, 
destruction and pollution (Toprak, 1993: 246-252).  
 
For all their denunciation of Western ‘civilization’, however, the discourses of the second 
Islamist generation thinkers in Turkey were firmly rooted in the idea of civilization, both in its 
universalist sense and in the particularist one of Islamic civilization, which had originated in 
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the nineteenth century. These discourses also echoed the rejection of modernization theories 
so widespread in the West during the same period; they have even been described as ‘post-
modern’ (Yavuz, 2003: 117; Çınar and Kadıoğlu, 1999), similarly to Western critics of 
modernization. This should come as no surprise, as the second-generation Islamist intellectuals 
were well-versed in Western social and political thought, social sciences, languages and ‘the 
structure of their discourse reflects the logical sequence of secular thought’ (Toprak, 1993: 
245). Sociologically, they were distinct from the traditional local religious leaders and felt at 
home in Istanbul, responding to the same problems and experiences as their secular 
counterparts (Meeker, 1994: 156). They had attended secular higher education establishments 
and spoke one or more European and Middle Eastern language; they had an interest in Western 
literature, philosophy, or social history; they wrote ‘in a conceptual and semantic field that has 
considerable overlap with [his] secular counterparts’; and fell within ‘the boundaries of the 
political and cultural discourse of the urban, educated Turkish elite’ (Meeker, 1991: 190-193). 
Ali Bulaç (b.1951) in particular, formulated his thought ‘according to the methodology of 
global contemporary academia and had to have a profound knowledge of the scholarly 
discourse in the West’ (Guida, 2010: 350-351).18 Partly as a result of this immersion, and 
similarly to the first generation of Islamists, this second generation accepted ‘the Eurocentric 
assertion of an essential difference between the West and the East’ and thereby reproduced 
Orientalism’s essentialist assumptions (Gülalp, 1997: 57-61). 
 
A partial exception to this line of thinking about civilization can be found in İsmet Özel (b. 
1944), one of the intellectuals of the second generation but also in many ways a sui generis 
 
18 Bulaç is a prolific writer but none of his monographs is focused on civilization as such. For Bulaç 
religions enable people to live together and make them medeni, civilized: Çınar and Kadıoğlu (1999: 
64-67). However, he criticized the notion of ‘civilization’ (in its universal sense) as such for originating 
in the West and being alien to an Islamic outlook: Meeker (1991: 200). In a published interview which 
highlighted the symbolic power of words, Bulaç distinguished between ‘medeniyet’ and ‘uygarlık’, 
arguing that the former belongs to the West and the latter to Islam: On5yirmi5 (2010).   
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figure. Özel is exceptional in recognizing that the term ‘civilization’ (in its universal sense) 
emerged relatively recently in history and is closely associated with modernity (İsmet Özel, 
personal communication, 2016).19 It is an idea he is profoundly critical of. He posits Islam as 
the counter-point of a universal civilization but his approach to it, and to the question of Islamic 
civilization, is different from other members of the second generation. Islamic civilization, he 
claims, today is non-existent. Since the nineteenth century only Western civilization exists and 
dominates others (Guida, 2014: 124-125). Neither the time of Muhammad nor that which 
passed under the rule of the first four caliphs were ‘civilized periods’ (Özel, 2013: 95). The 
Muslim way of life is [‘not] reflected in the civilization developed by Muslim states in the 
course of history. He thinks it is a mistake to confuse the Ottoman, Abbasid and Umayyad 
civilizations with the concept of Islamic society, as the West has done. The Ottoman past in 
particular must not be idealized. Islam itself is not a civilization (although it has the potential 
to engender one, which would be free of class differentiation and power hierarchy) (Meeker, 
1991: 214-215).  
 
Changes in the political situation and in the intellectual atmosphere in Turkey by the 1990s 
gave rise to a third generation of Islamist intellectuals and a new viewpoint on Islamic 
civilization. Islamist attempts to exclude human rights and democracy from their political 
thinking because they were ‘Western’ began to be abandoned as Islamists started embracing 
these very concepts to protect themselves against the Kemalist establishment. The European 
Union pressure for reform on Turkey seemed to offer to the Islamists the prospect of a legal 
shield and, by the late 1990s, some Islamist intellectuals had already become enthusiastic 
defenders of Turkey’s EU integration. This resulted in a ‘discursive shift from the West as the 
 
19 This view is shared by Gencer (2014). Özel’s ideas on the subject are developed primarily in his work 
Üç Mesele (2013). 
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foe of Islamic identity to a friend’ (Yavuz, 2003: 248), a shift that was epitomized in the 
changing views of Ali Bulaç who became supportive of Turkey’s membership in the EU by 
the 2000s (Guida, 2010: 349).  
 
The move from an anti-Western, defensive Islamist discourse to an Islamist – and Turkish – 
identity more open to the West was symbolized by the view that EU accession did not envisage 
a civilizational shift. Islamist parties, namely the Virtue party (1997-2001) and subsequently 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP), established in 2001, also changed their position on 
EU membership, abandoning the ‘conventional Islamic stand’ (Dağı, 2009: 45-56). For the first 
few years of the AKP government, which came to power in 2002, ‘integration into the West 
and maintaining Islamic identity [were] no longer seen as mutually exclusive choices’ (Dağı, 
2006: 92) - though this changed in the 2010s.  
 
Ahmet Davutoğlu was the key member of the third generation of Islamist intellectuals which 
emerged in the 2000s and 2010s20 and we can observe, in his oeuvre, continuous references to 
the idea of an Islamic civilization, juxtaposed with a Western civilization: this was particularly 
so in his two major works on the subject, both published in 1994 (Davutoğlu 1994a, 1994b). 
Davutoğlu argued that Turkey can have a central role in this Islamic civilization. In his later 
work, the book entitled Strategic Depth (2001), he maintained that countries-bridges like 
Turkey, which contain many civilizational heritages, are an important source for a new 
civilizational opening. Instead of a Huntington-style clash, Davutoğlu saw signs of a 
synthesizing of a new civilization which will spread in the world (2001: 563, 840-841). Turkey 
could become strong by adopting a wide and consensual sense of belonging and make a 
 
20 Davutoğlu was also the main architect of the AKP foreign policy, foreign policy advisor to the AKP 
government, foreign minister and prime minister until his departure in 2016. 
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contribution to global civilization by attempting a new civilizational opening thereby 
cancelling the trap of her ‘geocivilizational’ rejection (‘jeokültürel dışlanma’) (Davutoğlu, 
2001: 137).  
 
Hidden behind this view about civilizational convergence around Turkey, however, persisted 
quite a conventional and rather rigid representation of ‘Islamic civilization’, contrasted to 
‘Western civilization’. ‘East’ versus ‘West’ continued as the starting point of Davutoğlu’s 
thought, and he saw them as going back in history (even if he argued that conflict between 
them can be overcome).21 Similarly to religiously conservative Turkish circles, Davutoğlu 
viewed the Ottoman Empire as the protector of Muslim peoples and Islamic civilization against 
the West. For him, Turkey’s Republican pro-European orientation was a result of European 
hegemony and a temporary aberration and he promoted ‘a culturally motivated Turkish 
identity, historically anchored by the centuries-long confrontational dispute with Europe’ 
(Seufert, 2012: 13-15). All in all, in continuing to interpret it in essentialist terms, Davutoglu 





This article responded to Acharya’s call to integrate deep area studies knowledge and methods 
into a global IR by presenting the findings of an empirical study of the concept of civilization 
in Turkish Islamist thought. These findings, however, constitute a critique of other aspects of 
Acharya’s call and, more broadly, of the culturalist perspective on civilizational differences 
 
21 Tellingly, when commenting on Western civilization and culture in its present form, Davutoğlu 
highlighted alcoholism and prostitution as its most prominent characteristics (Özkan, 2015). 
22 
 
which overemphasizes the fractures between civilizations and overlooks the view that the 
concept of civilization itself is a recent one. A truly global IR, my analysis suggests, can only 
be developed if it is underpinned by the concepts of a shared history and modernity, as 
developed by Buzan and Lawson, among others. These concepts, by emphasizing 
synchronicity in the spread of ideas and processes and the entanglement between societies and 
regions, better enable us to capture the diversity and complexity of the modern world, without 
disregarding the commonalities that bind societies together across an imagined ‘East’ and 
‘West’. 
 
I grounded my argument in an examination of the emergence and trajectory of the concept of 
‘civilization’ in its universal sense and in the particular sense of ‘Islamic civilization’ which 
showed that they were both nineteenth century constructions, even though they are conceived 
as going back in history. Islamist discourses about civilization in Turkey are rooted in a 
nineteenth century vocabulary which the empire shared with Europe, and which Turkish 
Islamists, until today, share with the West. 
 
The article demonstrated its argument in some empirical detail. It showed that the concept of 
‘civilization’ emerged in the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century concurrently with 
Europe. Increasingly, a rift opened between the idea of civilization in the universal sense and 
the notion of particular civilizations and, by the late nineteenth century, the concept of an 
‘Islamic civilization’ had gained traction. By the turn of the twentieth century, ‘Islamic 
civilization’ had become a declaration of identity against the West.  
 
The Kemalist worldview which was rendered hegemonic with the creation of the Turkish 
Republic was challenged from the 1950s onwards by a series of Islamist intellectuals, 
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representing three generations or different schools of thought, each of which posited distinct, 
albeit inter-related notions of Islamic civilization and Turkey’s role within it. The first 
generation, which centered on the figure of Kısakürek, depicted Islamic civilization as the 
antithesis of the West. The second generation, which included thinkers such as Bulaç and Özel, 
rejected historical Islamic civilizations, including the Ottoman one, and argued that Muslims 
must look back to the ideal time of the prophet Muhammad for inspiration and guidance. The 
third generation, among whom Davutoğlu stands out, did not necessarily identify a clash 
between East and West but held on to an essentializing discourse about Islamic civilization. 
 
The view that there exist immutable differences between Eastern and Western civilizations 
runs through the history of Turkish Islamist thought in the Republican era. Yet, the framing of 
civilization and the interpretation of what the term itself means is shared between Islamist 
thinkers in Turkey and ‘the West’. There exists, since the nineteenth century, a commonality 
in frames and concepts which indicates a shared modern experience across the imagined ‘East’ 
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